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	SUMMARY
	SOVIET UNION
1.	MIG-15's apparently being withdrawn from Austria and Hungary (page 3).
	SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.	Effective government in Indonesia unlikely in near future (page 4)
	SOUTH ASIA
4.	Embassy foresees increased Soviet pressure on Afghanistan (page 5).
	NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5.	Mossadeq's supporters demand uncompromising stand on oil issue (page 5).
7. 8.	Egypt may join MEDO if British leave Canal zone (page 6). Britain considers supplying jets to Egypt (page 7).
	WESTERN EUROPE
9. 10.	American plane outside Berlin corridor when fired upon (page 8) French reject American advice on military budget (page 8).
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NATIONAL TELESCOPE AND	SOVIET UNION
	Recent reports on activity at Soviet airfields in Austria and Hungary suggest the withdrawal of significant jet fighter strength. Observations of Wiener Neustadt recently as 3 October reveal the presence of
only nine instead of the	usual 70 MIG-15's. the crates
removing the MIG's stat	Wiener Neustadt were for the purpose of ioned there to an unknown destination. the MIG's usually based at Deutsch Tokol airfields were not there in late tober.
190 MIG-15's is reminis Germany in early Octob	Comment: The apparent shift of jet air Army involving as many as 120 of its scent of the eastward departure from er 1951 of more than 200 jet fighters of their well-trained pilots. These jets were acceeding months.
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	SOUTH ASIA
4 .	Embassy foresees increased Soviet pressure on Afghanistan:
	The American Embassy in Kabul believes that Soviet pressure on Afghanistan is threatening South Asian security and that the USSR intends to use restrictive economic measures to prevent the development of northern Afghanistan. The Embassy also feels that subversive action will be coordinated with economic restrictions for maximum effort. Comment: There is no indication that
,	Soviet interest in Afghanistan is now greater than before, or that the recent Moscow protest is the first step in a campaign to increase pressure on that country.
	NEAR EAST - AFRICA
	Mossadeq's supporters demand uncompromising stand on oil issue:
5.	Mossaded & Supporters demand uncompromising stand on our issue.

The Ambassador comments that it is increasingly clear that Mossadeq can counter opposition to a settlement only by obtaining a large amount of money immediately.

without oil revenues.

negotiations. Kashani and other extremist members of the National Front are becoming convinced that it is possible to run the country

	- MEDO if Deitich	lacus Carol non		
7. Egypt may joi	n MEDO if British	Teave Canar zon	<u>e:</u>	
	Egypt i	may join MEDO a	as a quid pro quo of the Canal Zone.	
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	No progress is possible, the Ambassador believes, unless Great Britain announces its intention to leave the Canal base, actually begins to evacuate, and agrees to a final withdrawal of British troops, other than technicians, at the same time that Egypt joins MEDO.	
	because of pressure from extremist elements within the army the general must produce results by next February.	50X1
	Comment: Previously Egyptian officers had indicated a willingness to make a secret agreement on MEDO in return for receiving American arms.	•
8.	Britain considers supplying jets to Egypt:	
	Great Britain is expected within a few days to ask French and American approval for furnishing at least some of the jet aircraft contracted for by Egypt. The US Embassy believes that the Foreign Office hopes to find some means of overcoming anticipated French objections before formally presenting this proposal to the three-power committee on arms for the Near East.	50X1
	Comment: In late August Britain made available to Egypt trainers and spare parts, but has until now declined to fill these Egyptian orders on the pretext of a 1950 embargo on high-priority items to other than NATO and Commonwealth countries.	
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In late September, however, the Churchill government, over French opposition, offered 14 jets each to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. The American Ambassador in Cairo states that the Egyptians are aware of this, and that the British Ambassador has advised his Foreign Office that serious consequences might follow unless Britain changed its position.

WESTERN EUROPE

9.	American	plane	outside	Berlin	corridor	when	fired	upon:
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American officials in Germany report that the United States Air Force ambulance plane fired on by one of the two harassing Soviet MIG-15's on 8 October was 10 to 25 miles outside the Berlin air corridor and having radio trouble at the time.

10. French reject American advice on military budget:

In reporting the French Government's "heated" rejection of his oral statement on prospective American aid to France in fiscal year 1953, Ambassador Dunn

expressed his belief that "most serious strains" are developing in French-American relations.

The French consider that the American statement threatens to infringe on their sovereignty. They object principally to the implied conditions of American aid, namely, that the French military budget for calendar year 1953 should be appreciably larger than that for 1952, and that the government should follow American suggestions in spending the franc counterpart of the dollar aid received.

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Comment: This cabinet position reflects the aggressively nationalistic line taken by Pinay on 7 October to postpone an immediate foreign policy debate in the National Assembly aimed at forcing the resignation of Foreign Minister Schuman, who is under attack for being too "soft" toward American policies.

Although the French Government is expected to propose a three-percent increase in the military budget over 1952, the means of financing this increase has not yet been found. Even this anticipated budget appears insufficient to cover either the current rate of French military production beyond December 1952 or commitments in Indochina.